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Abstract: 
Edwards & Steins (The Role of Contextual Factors in Common Pool Resource Analysis. Paper presented to 7th 
Conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Vancouver, British Columbia, 
June 1998) developed an analytic framework for multiple-use common pool resource (CPR) regimes that 
emphasizes the importance of contextual factors. As a preliminary application of the framework, this paper 
‘backsolves’ from outcomes to underlying contextual factors, and identifies primary cultural factors that occur 
in the development of American state wildlife management agencies. The factors are then placed into five 
categories: physical, political, economic, legal and scientific. The resulting examination of the management 
regime clarifies changes in agencies’ action strategies, and potential patterns of interaction, as they respond to 
new institutional pressures from recreation and conservation interests. The paper concludes with four important 
research directions that have emerged from the discussion. (1) Are contextual factors better expressed as a 
matrix (network/decision tree/hierarchy) rather than a list? (2) To what extent do spatial factors influence 
contextual factors? (3) How do contextual factors affect decisions at the three levels of institutional choice: 
constitutional, collective and operational? (4) How can we develop a structured research agenda that examines 
increasingly complex CPRs as we refine the analytic framework? 
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Article: 
Introduction 
In relatively simple common pool resource (CPR) regimes (for example, single, small-scale irrigation systems), 
factors that affect resource appropriation may be readily isolated and tracked longitudinally to provide a fairly 
accurate picture of the institutional structure of the regime. However, in complex, multiple-use, multiple-user 
CPR regimes, the factors increase exponentially, and a clarifying analytic framework becomes essential to make 
sense of the institutions and their interactions. 
 
This paper explores the usefulness of the framework developed by Edwards & Steins (1998) through the 
example found in the CPR regime of American state wildlife management. The focus is on state wildlife 
management agencies and contextual factors that have influenced their institutional design and sustainability.
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American state wildlife agencies are used as an example rather than a case study; a case study of wildlife 
management in the USA is far too complex to present in a journal paper. Readers who desire a full treatment of 
the evolution of American wildlife law and management should consult Lund (1980), Tober (1981), Belanger 
(1988), Orr (1992), Bean & Rowland (1997). International wildlife issues are covered in Birnie & Boyle (1993). 
However, it is for just such a complex problem that Edwards & Steins (1998) have offered their analytic 
framework. 
 
Wildlife management in the USA presents an especially interesting analytical problem: the US government is a 
federal system with overlapping legal authorities for many natural resources, and wildlife is used for a variety of 
purposes by a multiplicity of appropriators. Initially, states had exclusive jurisdiction over wildlife within state 
borders, but wildlife management in the USA is now a unique blend of federal and state policies. The federal 
government has pre-empted state jurisdiction over some species that are threatened, or endangered, or that are 
subject to international treaty obligations,
2 
and wildlife on federal land is generally subject to federal 
jurisdiction, rather than to the jurisdiction of the states within which the land is located. Even though the level 
of government that holds property rights in wildlife may vary by both species and location, virtually all property 
rights in wildlife are vested in governments rather than in landowners.
3
 I have chosen to focus on state 
management agencies for two reasons. First, state agencies are the primary institutions with responsibility for 
implementation of wildlife management policies. Second, they are nested (albeit not in a tidy Weberian 
hierarchy) within the national wildlife management regime and are, therefore, more acted upon than are federal 
agencies. 
 
In this paper, I identify contextual factors (as defined by Edwards & Steins, 1998) as they occur in the example 
of the evolution of state wildlife management agencies. The identified factors are then placed in general 
categories to commence operationalization of contextual factors, that is, to move ‘contextual factors’ from an 
environment-embracing framework diagram to a set of categories applicable to multiple-use CPRs in general. In 
the section on future research of this paper, I explore how the factors identified in the example provide analytic 
insights that aid in the analysis current management pressures faced by the agencies, and to identify the range of 
future scenarios which agencies may face. The final section of the paper suggests future avenues for research. 
 
Identifying contextual factors in state wildlife management 
In this section, the evolution of American state wildlife management agencies is summarized. The purpose of 
the discussion is twofold: to identify contextual factors that have had a substantial effect on either changing or 
sustaining the agencies’ institutional designs, and to illustrate the usefulness of contextual factors in 
understanding the development of CPR institutions. 
 
Contextual factors are environmental factors that both surround and permeate the establishment and 
maintenance of a CPR regime.
4
 Edwards & Steins (1999) developed a framework for organizing and analysing 
information about multiple-use, multiple-user CPR regimes that incorporates contextual factors. They 
distinguish two types of contextual factors: local contextual factors, such as the availability of alternative 
sources of income that ‘have a direct influence on the situational variables of the CPR [regime], including the 
user community, and can largely be affected by the user community’; and remote contextual factors, such as 
international treaty agreements that ‘have an indirect influence on the situational variables of the CPR [regime] 
and are usually outside the control of the user community’ (Edwards & Steins, 1999, pp. 207, 208 ).
5
 
 
Identification of contextual factors is important because they are a rich and complex influence on the options 
and strategies of all appropriators, regardless of the size or sophistication of the regimes in which the 
appropriators operate. Many CPR studies focus on the decision-making rules (institutions) that govern 
appropriation of the resource flow, and contextual factors become an analytic given. In multiple-use, multiple-
user CPR regimes, however, sets of operational, collective-choice and even constitutional rules vary with each 
intersection of use and user. For example, migratory bird hunters are affected by unwritten sportsmen’s codes, 
local rules regarding access to hunting sites, gun laws, state hunting seasons, and federal regulations on certain 
species. Birdwatchers for these same migratory birds can utilize different sites, have no gun or season 
restrictions, and do not seek to disturb or to take the birds. Research scientists may have the same institutional 
constraints as both of the other groups, in addition to their own professional decision-making rules. Thus, both 
the resource domains and the resource flows vary, and the sets of rules for each use and users are different also. 
 
The user community in the case of state wildlife management is, in theory, the entire population of the state. 
However, because states are constitutionally barred from interfering with interstate commerce, citizens of other 
states may use public state facilities and, assuming they have the proper licenses, may even hunt within another 
state.
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 Thus, the user community for American wildlife is comprised of any person engaged in wildlife-related 
activities who has complied with appropriation and access rules set by the state.
7
 
 
Contextual factors are important in single-use regimes; however, in a single-use regime, local and remote 
factors will bear on any individual appropriator with roughly equivalent weight. In contrast, in multiple-use, 
multiple-user regimes, the range of local and remote factors that might affect the regime is increased; a set of 
factors that influences one may have little, more, or no effect on another user. Thus, for multiple-use, multiple-
user regimes, contextual factors are more important analytically than they are in single-use regimes. In the 
discussion that follows, a number of important contextual factors in the complicated regime that has evolved 
around American wildlife resources are identified. They have been developed by ‘backsolving’ (Feeny, 1994) 
and draw heavily from the implementation framework of Mazmanian & Sabatier (1983) supplemented by 
insights from Ostrom (1990) and McCay (1998). 
 
At the time of the American Revolution, and for over 100 years following it, traditional ownership of wildlife 
was vested in state governments through the transfer of the powers of the English sovereign to the colonies and 
hence to the states. The ‘state ownership doctrine’ assigned property rights in wildlife to the state in which the 
wildlife was found, and the state then held this property in trust for its citizens (Geer vs Connecticut, 161 US 
519 (1896)).
8
 Initially, the federal government was powerless to protect wildlife because the existing 
understanding of federalism barred federal interference in state wildlife management [remote factors: US 
Constitution, federal court decisions]. 
 
In the early days of the 20th century, species that are abundant today, such as eastern white-tailed deer and wild 
turkey, were on the brink of extinction; some, such as the passenger pigeon, slipped over the brink and were lost 
forever. Interest groups concerned at that time with wildlife were fairly well defined (market hunters, sportsmen 
and conservationists), but their interests were usually limited by their state borders. Across the nation, a 
patchwork of state hunting regulations and irregular enforcement left many species at the mercy of the casual 
hunter, and there was no effort to coordinate the states’ legislation (Orr, 1992). In the first decade of the 20th 
century, national interest groups arose that recognized the need for national solutions to interjurisdictional 
policy problems, and they began to focus their attention on the federal government. By 1920, the states had lost 
their absolute control over wildlife through treaties (e.g. 1916 Migratory Bird Treaty), legislation (e.g. 1900 
Lacey Act), and court decisions (e.g. Missouri vs Holland, 252 US 416 (1920)),
9
 and the mix of federal and 
state jurisdiction that exists today began to develop [remote factors: treaties, international agreements, US 
Constitution, national legislation, interstate commerce, federal court decisions, national interest groups; local 
factors: state legislation, state agency regulations, employment opportunities, state and local tax structures]. 
 
Throughout the 19th century, the inability of the states to provide sustainable game resources stemmed from 
many factors. (1) Game seemed so plentiful that many were unconvinced that a problem existed or, if 
convinced, refused to accept that diminishing numbers were the result of indiscriminate hunting. We see this 
denial at the end of the 20th century also, with many fishermen on both coasts refusing to accept that over-
fishing is a major cause of declining fish stocks [remote factors and local factors: scientific data]. (2) Local 
custom dating to colonial times endorsed unrestricted hunting even on private land; vestiges of this attitude 
remain today in state laws that assume private land is open to hunting unless it is posted (Lund, 1980) [local 
factors: custom]. (3) As wealthy sportsmen often brought substantial business into rural areas, rural-dominated 
legislatures were understandably reluctant to cut off the income supply by restricting hunting (Tober, 1981) 
[local factors: interest groups, constituencies, employment opportunities]. (4) States that shared both migratory 
stocks and borders frequently suffered long-standing and often violent disputes, over resources and had little 
incentive to join multi-state compacts; such compacts would, in any case, require congressional approval, and 
states were reluctant to involve Congress in their internal affairs (Buck,1988) [remote factors: political 
decisions of remote states; local factors: political decisions of adjoining states, interest groups]. (5) No 
established professional class of administrators for wildlife existed; the Pendleton Act, passed in 1887, initiated 
a professional civil service corps at the federal level, but most states lagged far behind; state governments were 
so far from professional game management that, in many states, sportsmen’s clubs and conservation groups 
such as the fledgling Audubon Society paid private detectives to enforce the game laws (Orr, 1992; Tober, 
1981, pp. 215–216) [local factors: state legislation, agency resource allocation]. 
 
Many state wildlife agencies began as citizen groups of sportsmen or conservationists eager to protect their own 
state interests. Sporting constituencies wanted regulation to restrain market hunters from demolishing stocks, 
although their reasons often differed. Some wanted to shield their own stocks from the encroachments of out-of-
state hunters, while others wanted to protect private game preserves to lure wealthy hunters (often from out of 
state) into their communities. Regardless of the motives of the sportsmen, the conservation interests were their 
natural allies. Together they urged the creation of state fish and game agencies. Quite naturally, they also 
wanted to control the activities of the agencies. By the end of the 19th century, almost every state had 
established fish and game commissions (Tober, 1981, p. 160) [local factors: interest groups, constituencies, 
employment opportunities]. 
 
Today these commissions continue in 27 states. The commission form of regulatory agency, comprised of 
political appointees with expertise and experience in the policy arena, is frequently found in state government, 
although the close and usually cordial relationship between fish and wildlife agencies and their client groups is 
not common. In recent years, some states have consolidated their natural resource concerns into one centralized 
agency; six states have boards or commissions that oversee all natural resources, while several have retained 
some aspect of their old wildlife commissions nested within the larger agencies. Only two States—Maine and 
North Dakota—have separate wildlife agencies that are not overseen by a commission [local factors: state 
legislation, interest groups, constituencies ].
10
 
 
Commissioners are appointed by their state governors, occasionally subject to confirmation by the state senate, 
or other legislative body. Many states have distribution requirements for the commissions; for example, in West 
Virginia each congressional district provides one commissioner and the remainder is drawn from the state at 
large. Usually state law requires commissioners to have some expertise in fish and wildlife. Commissioners 
often have staggered terms which provides even more independence from political vagaries [local factors: state 
legislation, state court decisions, interest groups, constituencies]. Although on paper the authority and 
responsibility of the commissions, the agency directors and the other state natural resource agencies are clearly 
defined, in practice there is a great deal of informal communication, negotiation and compromise. For example, 
a commission is unlikely to overrule the recommendations of its state wildlife biologists who are in turn 
unlikely to recommend politically unrealistic policies [local factors: interest groups, constituencies, scientific 
data]. 
 
State wildlife management agencies are funded by a combination of state general funds, license fees and federal 
aid. License revenues and federal aid provide a stable funding mechanism for the agencies. State agencies 
receive funds from license fees that, as a condition of continuing federal fish and wildlife aid, cannot be 
diverted from the agency. Federal aid revenues to the states (provided to the states via the Federal Aid in 
Wildlife Restoration Act of 1937 and Federal Aid in Sport Fish Restoration Act of 1950) increase as prices rise 
because the source of the federal funds is an excise tax. The state share may also fluctuate with the number of 
hunters which is an additional incentive to provide an abundant, well-managed stock of game, but the agency 
can rely on a relatively predictable and steady source of income. Although the origin of the federal aid is tax 
revenue, it is, quite improbably, a tax voluntarily assumed by the taxpayers and vigorously defended against 
reductions by sportsmen, manufacturers and conservationists.
11
 Even though wildlife -related activities generate 
significant expenditures ($101.2 billion in 1996; US Department of the Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service and 
US Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1996, p. 5), contemporary agency missions and their 
primary constituencies are not directly motivated by economic forces. There is little market for game animals, 
although some trophy animals such as bighorn sheep are themselves an economic commodity and there is a 
considerable market built around their appropriation [remote factors: demographic change, national legislation, 
federal agency regulations, national interest groups, federal tax structures; local factors: state legislation, 
interest groups, constituencies, state tax structures]. 
 
The performance of wildlife management agencies is largely measured by the extent to which they provide 
access to sustainable populations of mature, harvestable animals. Hunting seasons, bag limits and related 
regulations are adjusted to anticipate or to compensate, for shifts in animal populations. This is not necessarily 
an ecological approach.
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 There are, of course, substantial benefits for many wild species when any habitat is 
improved and preserved, and endangered species do receive special considerations, but the management of 
habitat primarily to sustain game species may also produce less than optimal conditions for non-game species 
[remote factors: climate change, demographic change, incidence of disease, predator–prey relationships, 
national legislation, data; local factors: habitat conditions, incidence of disease, state agency regulations, 
enforcement, agency resource allocations, local ordinances]. 
 
The contextual factors identified above, and listed in Table 1, are local and remote factors that would affect any 
given state wildlife management agency. They represent only a portion of the full panoply of local and remote 
factors that might influence the exceedingly complex resource regime of American wildlife management. They 
are used here to demonstrate how categorization and consideration of local and remote contextual factors enrich 
our understanding of multiple-use CPR regimes. 
 
 
 
While most of these factors are self-explanatory, several do bear elaboration. First, ‘court decisions’ are both 
political and legal factors. They are political because the decision to continue a law suit, to fight a law suit 
rather than to settle or to arbitrate, and to some extent, the court opinions, are all political choices. Once an 
opinion is issued, compliance is also a political decision (How fully must an agency comply? What are the costs 
of compliance compared with the benefits of non-compliance?), as well as a legal constraint. Similarly, 
formulation and implementation of ‘agency regulations’ are both political and legal factors. 
 
Second, there is some overlap between ‘constituencies’ and ‘interest groups’. On the one hand, the user 
community (sportsmen, recreational users, etc.) are constituents of the state wildlife management agencies, as 
agency actions directly affect their access and use of the resource. On the other hand, sportsmen and 
recreational users are also members of interest groups (e.g. National Rifle Association, Audubon Society and 
National Wildlife Federation) that seek to affect agency decisions. The agencies themselves are members of 
interest groups, such as the International Association of Fish and Wildlife Agencies. In this paper, 
constituencies are the individuals who make up the user community, while interest groups are formally 
organized groups of individuals or of associations that influence policy decisions. The two sets are not mutually 
exclusive. 
 
Finally, ‘scientific data’ is listed as both local and remote because of the amount of control a state agency has 
over the data collected. State level information may have a substantial impact on state decisions, and how that 
data set is collected and used is largely in the control of state agencies. State level information on biological 
systems is state specific and longitudinal, although it is frequently incompatible with data gathered in other 
jurisdictions. State agencies have almost a century of administrative experience with the species and habitats in 
the state; state biologists have longitudinal information on population shifts, weather patterns, water flows, 
flooding conditions—a myriad of data that can only be properly assessed through the lens of local experience. 
Data collected at more remote sites, or by scientists over whom the agencies have little control, is less useful to 
the states but may have a substantial effect on remote factors. However, even if an enormous centralized data 
collection process were initiated, it could never duplicate the ‘time and place’ information gathered locally over 
an extended period, and information costs are too high (Ostrom et al., 1993, pp. 120–122). Another impediment 
to multistate data collections is data incompatibility. For example, to be comparable, biological data should be 
collected using the same method and timing at each collection site, and samples should be analysed by identical 
processes. Data that do not meet these criteria may not be compatible even with sophisticated statistical analysis 
(Buck, 1988). 
 
Exploring the multiple-use framework 
The preceding section of this paper defined remote and local contextual factors, recounted the bare bones of the 
history of state wildlife management agencies, and identified a group of contextual factors that have affected 
either the physical and technological characteristics of the resource, the decision-making rules or the user 
community. In this section, I apply those factors to a discussion of how emerging trends in wildlife management 
will affect the efficiency and effectiveness of the agencies. Following the analytic framework developed by 
Edwards & Steins (1999) (here reproduced as Figure 1), we can see how changes in local and remote contextual 
factors have affected institutional stability of the agencies that manage resources. 
 
As Edwards & Steins (1999) suggest, working backwards from changes in outcomes is useful in identifying 
critical contextual factors. Once identified, these factors also illuminate our understanding of current 
institutional arrangements. In the last 10 years, wildlife agencies have been under increasing political pressure 
to expand their mandates to include a greater concern with habitat preservation and biodiversity. At the same 
time, political pressure is exerted by a wide-ranging coalition of other interest groups to promote reduced 
government regulation, enhanced private property rights, economic and industrial expansion, urbanization and a 
host of other policy outcomes that are antithetical to protecting either habitat or biodiversity. This places state 
agencies in a politically precarious position. 
 
Physical and technological characteristics of wildlife are especially susceptible to local and remote physical 
factors such as incidence of disease, habitat changes, climate change, demographic change or recurring 
predator–prey relationships that are largely beyond the control of management agencies. For example, changing 
patterns of urbanization fragment habitat, eliminate contiguous ranges necessary for some species, and drive 
others into areas where they interfere with human activities. Agencies usually respond to these factor changes 
through incremental adjustments in decision-making rules, especially operation rules (catch limits, seasons, etc.) 
Occasionally, large-scale interventions (e.g. closing fisheries or listing species under the Endangered Species 
Act) require changes to collective-choice or constitutional rules. In contrast, political, economic and legal 
remote factors (treaties and international agreements, the US Constitution, national legislation, federal court 
decisions, federal regulations, political decisions of remote states, national interest groups, interstate commerce, 
federal tax structure) have little direct impact on the characteristics of wildlife resources; rather they constrain 
the collective-choice and constitutional rules that define the options available to the managers by protecting 
certain species or habitats, and curtailing the state manager’s bundle of property rights (e.g. placing wildlife on 
federal lands under federal jurisdiction). 
 
 
 
Scientific remote factors also have no effect on physical and technological characteristics. However, social 
characteristics of the user community may be affected by remote factors, as interest groups at both the local and 
remote levels strive to shift cultural attitudes towards animals and hunting. For example, loudly expressed 
national opinions about wild horses and burros led to federal protection under the Wild Free-Roaming Horses 
and Burros Act of 1971. The effect of these contextual factors on local communities which use the same 
resource domain as wild horses has been immediate and, for some users, substantial. The physical factor of 
more wild horses means that the user communities for western grazing land must adjust to new restrictions on 
removing herbivores that compete with their cattle for forage (decision-making rules). Some of the users now 
also forgo the income from selling wild horses for pet food. This generates new action strategies: some 
westerners have continued illegal round-ups, some cooperate with conservation groups to preserve mustang 
herds, while still others work with the state prisons to train inmates to break horses for the Bureau of Land 
Management (BLM) sales. This federal law has also increased frustration with federally imposed mandates on 
Western range management (characteristics of user community) which in turn increases support for the property 
rights movement.
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 A similar example on the local level is the impact of the 1996–1998 rabies epidemic (local 
factor: incidence of disease) on the east coast of the USA (physical and technological characteristics of the 
resource) which changed public attitudes towards viewing wildlife; harmless possums sleeping in city park 
trees have been surrounded by police, shaken down by firemen, and killed for fear of rabies (changes in 
collective-choice and constitutional rules). 
 
Arguably, the greatest change in contextual factors faced by state management agencies today is driven by new 
constituencies of conservationists and recreational users; they look to their state (and local) agencies to provide 
and to control wildlife, and wildlife habitat, for non-consumptive uses such as hiking, photography and 
wilderness adventure.
14
 In recent years, conservation interests have also focused on two new concerns: 
biodiversity and sustainability. These concerns are a result of a powerful mix of local and remote factors: 
scientific data suggests to the risk-averse that irreversible environmental harm is imminent. Remote political 
factors have tended to support pro-business policy trends (e.g. deregulation, the property rights movement, 
changes in wetlands protection regulation) which again challenge the risk-averse conservation constituencies. 
Conservation interests have begun to see an opportunity for issue linkage by associating new non-game wildlife 
policy interests with existing game programmes. This puts the agencies on a political tightrope, with one side 
held by their traditional sportsmen’s constituencies and the other by recreational users and conservation 
concerns.
15
 As the agency constituencies become less homogenous, the political tightrope that the agencies must 
walk becomes thinner, and the crosswinds pick up. 
 
As shown in the example of state wildlife agencies, the remote factors that were most influential on a regular 
basis were national interest groups and national legislation while at the local level, state legislation, state 
interest groups, state agency regulations and constituencies were frequently influential. The recent emphasis on 
recreation and non-game species is reinforced by new interest groups with different resources, policy networks, 
political orientations, and policy goals. They will influence state legislation, and they will force agencies to 
consider redistribution of resources. If they are successful, an even more profound effect will occur in the 
patterns of interaction between the agencies and their constituencies. The hunting constituency will find its 
influence diluted. Qualifications for commissioners are likely to change to include more conservation interests. 
Unless an insulated and reliable revenue source for non-game programmes is in place, the balance between the 
state legislatures and the agencies may become unstable, and in some states, legislative interests may seize the 
opportunity to rework the relationship. For example, if state legislatures simply mandate greater consideration 
of non-game programmes without increasing general revenue funding, agencies will be forced to cut game 
programmes, thereby aggravating the original hunting constituencies and disrupting their current smooth issue 
networks (Heclo, 1978). Newer, non-game constituencies will still be negotiating their role in the policy balance 
and may see this as an opportunity to garner more resources. The resulting conflict over agency resource 
allocation will place state wildlife agencies in vulnerable positions within state government. 
 
Future research directions 
Although the primary topic of this paper is not state wildlife agencies, the framework must be able to address 
case-specific questions if it is to be useful. In the early stages of building theory, it is best to be inclusive rather 
than exclusive; that is, it is easier to discard unneeded supplies than to find we are inadequately provisioned. 
Applying the analytic framework to the example of state wildlife management agencies suggests a number of 
interesting substantive questions that then give rise to methodological concerns. 
 
Are contextual factors better expressed as a matrix (network/decision tree/hierarchy) rather than as a list? 
 
In the analytic framework, contextual factors are shown as a ‘rain of arrows’. The discussion of federal 
protection of wild horses on western lands shows that contextual factors affect each other as well as the other 
variables in the framework. Even a cursory examination of the list of local and remote factors shows mutual 
dependence; for example, interest groups have a direct effect on agencies, but they also affect legislation, 
regulations, and court decisions. It may be helpful to develop general categories to be used in the framework; 
for example, five categories are developed in this paper: physical, political, economic, legal and scientific. 
These categories might be null sets for some resources but because the framework is a conceptual tool, we 
should consider even the null sets. While excessive fidelity to every nuanced interconnection will turn our 
framework into a miserable Gordian knot, erring on the side of oversimplification robs the framework of 
validity. One promising graphic technique is the use of matrices that show intersection points in a concise chart. 
Clear graphic displays of relationships among and between the variables in the framework would make the 
framework easier to apply to other case studies. 
 
To what extent do spatial factors influence contextual factors? 
 
Agencies of adjoining states are likely to cooperate on a wide range of policy issues, but as states become more 
geographically remote, the likelihood of cooperation decreases.
16
 However, wildlife is a fugitive resource that 
often crosses political borders, with the result that outcomes in one far-off jurisdiction may affect the resource 
in another jurisdiction. For example, if America’s disappearing wetlands diminish the reproductive success of 
ducks, Canadian hunters may have insufficient game. Is American wetlands policy a local or remote factor for 
Canadian hunters? It has a ‘direct’ influence on the situation variables which under our definitions of local and 
remote factors would earn a ‘local’ label, but it is largely outside the control of the user community which 
should make it count as a remote factor. We need to think about how to operationalize spatial effects. 
 
How do contextual factors affect decisions at the three levels of institutional choice: constitutional, collective 
and operational? 
 
Constitutional choice 
At the level of constitutional choice, the power of the states to regulate wildlife is quite literally a constitutional 
one; this is one of the ‘reserved’ powers of the states under the US Constitution. 
17
 In the past century, the 
balance between national and state power has shifted, and the responsibilities of the states over wildlife are 
constrained by such remote factors as treaties, legislation and court decisions. However, the states still largely 
control game animals, and this power is delegated by state legislatures to state management agencies. Are 
multiple-use commons more likely to be affected at the constitutional level by contextual factors? If so, are 
remote factors more or less influential than local ones? 
 
Collective choice 
Collective choice decisions are then made at the agency level through rule-making and adjudication as well as 
resource allocation (personnel, funding, etc.). Agency administrators conduct hearings on proposed regulatory 
changes, consider current research results, and consult with adjoining states that share wildlife ranges before 
making final decisions. Because these decisions are made at the administrative rather than the legislative level, 
they can be changed fairly rapidly in response to new scientific data or sudden, unanticipated changes in local 
factors such as habitat, disease, or climate. How do the activities of agencies as agents affect the institutional 
design of the regime? They are embedded in a complex administrative structure. How do they balance policy 
mandates with bureaucratic imperatives? 
 
Operational choice 
Operational choice decisions are also made at the agency level by ‘street-level’ bureaucrats (perhaps we need to 
coin a new term for environmental operations: the ‘field-level’ bureaucrat) because decisions about monitoring, 
enforcement, sanctioning, and implementation are made not by the appropriators (hunters and recreationists), 
but by agency personnel. For example, one prominent group of field-level administrators in the state wildlife 
management regime is state game wardens. They are also state citizens with the same rights of access and 
appropriation as other citizens. When they are acting in their official capacity, they are responsible for enforcing 
state wildlife laws and regulations. This involves both monitoring and, to some extent, sanctioning (in the same 
sense that a police officer can control sanctions by exercising discretion in choosing which charge to bring). 
Their authority comes from the state government, and the powers of the state government are, in turn, given to it 
by the citizens of the state. Thus, although citizens are not directly participating in the operational choice of the 
regime, they do participate directly in the constitutional choices (by electing officials), and the collective choice 
decisions (by public participation and influence on the elected officials who ultimately control the agencies). To 
what extent does this shift in locus of operational choice decisions affect the operation of the multiple-use 
commons? 
 
How can we develop a structured research agenda that examines increasingly complex CPRs as we refine the 
analytic framework? 
 
While regional differences among the states account for a great deal of variation in contextual factors, two 
issues especially germane to this initial paper draw our attention to the divisions between eastern and western 
states: the impact of federal landownership, and differences in water law. The federal lands comprise over 700 
million acres, or about one-third of the USA, with most of the land held in the western states. In some western 
states, the federal government owns over half of the land. For western-state wildlife management agencies, the 
relative weight of remote and local contextual factors is different from the relative weight in the eastern states. 
In addition, water law in the west is based on prior appropriation rather than riparian rights. It seems likely that 
this difference would affect the ability of state agencies to manage habitat. In the narrow context of wildlife 
management, at some point we may need to disaggregate the American states into regions (perhaps prior 
appropriation (western) and riparian rights (eastern), or percentage of federal land within state boundaries). How 
should the differences between eastern and western states be reflected in discussing contextual factors in 
American state wildlife management? The difficulty here may be that the particular CPR used in this paper is 
too large for the framework in these early stages. We may be asking too much of an embryonic theory to 
embrace a resource domain covering most of a continent, 50 state agencies with different constituencies and 
cultures, and an uneven federal presence. Multiple-use CPRs differ widely in their complexity, and rather than 
encouraging a smorgasbord of case studies we should consider a more structured research agenda that examines 
increasingly complex multiple-use CPRs as the analytic framework becomes more sophisticated. The value of 
this exercise is in organized, explicit consideration of contextual factors and the elements of the framework: 
physical and technological characteristics of the resource, decision-making rules, social characteristics of the 
user community, action strategies, patterns of interaction and outcomes. We must begin to make routine 
analyses of multiple-use CPRs and to operationalize the variables in the framework. By using a common 
language, we identify analytic similarities that lead to a better descriptive theory for multiple-use CPRs. A 
single example does little by itself to advance a theory, but a series of examples subjected to a uniform analytic 
framework will improve our understanding of complex CPR institutions. 
 
Conclusion 
The value of this exercise is in organized, explicit consideration of contextual factors and the elements of the 
framework: physical and technological characteristics of the resource, decision-making rules, social 
characteristics of the user community, action strategies, patterns of interaction and outcomes. We should begin 
to perform routine analyses of multiple-use, multiple-user CPRs and to operationalize the variables in the 
framework. By using a common language, we identify analytic similarities that lead to a better descriptive 
theory for multiple-use CPRs. A single example does little by itself to advance theory, but a series of examples 
subjected to a uniform analytic framework will improve our understanding of complex CPR institutions. 
 
Notes 
1. The paper does not address fisheries for several reasons: in coastal states, inland and marine fisheries are 
frequently managed by separate agencies; in marine fisheries policy, the federal role is substantial and 
while commercial fisheries play a large part in state policies, there is no equivalent issue in wildlife 
management. 
2. For example, Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, Endangered Species Act of 1973 and the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species [CITES] of 1973. 
3. Of course, landowners have property rights that affect use of wildlife on their property. For example, 
landowners may bar hunters or hikers, or they may charge fees for access to their land for hunting or 
other forms of recreation. But American wildlife is neither privately owned (res privatae) nor unowned 
until taken (res nullius). 
4. Our discussion of contextual factors bears a strong resemblance to the public policy literature that 
addresses endogenous and exogenous factors affecting policy implementation (e.g. Mazmanian & 
Sabatier, 1983), and to the cultural theory approach that originated in cultural anthropology (Douglas, 
1982) and was subsequently adopted by some public policy scholars (e.g. Buck, 1989; Thompson et al., 
1990). This is an example of convergent evolution which in ecology is defined as ‘the independent 
evolution of similar traits among unrelated organisms resulting from similar selective pressures’ (Chiras, 
1994, p. 71; Sunquist, 1996), but also occurs in the social sciences when similar concepts arise 
independently in different academic disciplines. 
5. In a very small-scale system, personal local factors such as health or family size may have more effect 
than they would in a larger, more bureaucratic system. This, however, is not what we mean by local 
factors. Using personal factors is not analytically feasible; data collection would be impossible for any 
but the smallest of systems and the nightmare of infinite regression would soon overwhelm the analyst. 
Our discussion of local factors is limited to those local factors, which affect, or have the potential to 
affect, the user-pool as a whole. 
6. This is not an undifferentiated right. In Baldwin vs Fish and Game Commission of Montana, 436 US 
371 (1978), the Supreme Court upheld the right of Montana to charge out-of-state hunters a substantially 
higher fee for elk-hunting licenses. 
7. This is not an open-access regime, although it bears a superficial resemblance to one. States do not use 
restricted access as a management technique (although they could). For example, hunters must purchase 
a license to exercise their rights to appropriate the resource (game); however, the license is not an 
exclusion device. This point was made clearly by the federal courts in 1983, when the state of Virginia 
argued that conservation interests allowed it to impose a residency requirement for licenses to fish in 
Virginia waters. The court ruled that Virginia clearly had no conservation interest that could override the 
national interest in interstate commerce because there was no limit on the number of Virginia residents 
allowed to have licenses (Tangier Sound Watermen’s Association vs Douglas, 541 F. Supp. 1287 (E.D. 
Virginia, 1983)). State resource stocks are protected not by limiting access, but instead through limits on 
harvests and restricted seasons. This is politically astute. The legal right of citizens to hunt state wildlife 
is not infringed; instead, the community of appropriators approves the creation of game commissions 
and agencies, voluntarily assumes fees to support their work and delegates to them the responsibility for 
making appropriation rules. 
8. In 1979, the Supreme Court explicitly overruled Geer in Hughes vs Oklahoma, 441 US 322. 
9. For a fuller discussion of the erosion of the state ownership doctrine, see Bean & Rowland (1997, 
Chapter 1) and Buck (1996a, Chapter 6, especially pp. 117–22). 
10. These data are compiled from the 1995 Conservation Directory (Gordon, 1995) and the State Wildlife 
Laws Handbook (Musgrave & Stein, 1993) and supplemented by telephone interviews. 
11. For a full account of the federal aid programmes, see Buck (1996a, pp. 122–125, 1996b). 
12. It does not, for example, usually incorporate predator species as a natural counterweight to 
overpopulation of prey; on the rare occasions where predators have been included, the agencies have 
paid a high political price. The recent reintroduction of wolves into Yellowstone National Park in 
Wyoming and the Alligator River National Wildlife Refuge in North Carolina infuriated local ranchers, 
although research consistently shows that wolves rarely prey on livestock and have a positive culling 
effect on wild deer populations. 
13. For an especially lucid introduction to the property rights movement, see Newton & Dillingham (1997, 
pp. 164–184). 
14. Public expectation that state agencies will be the change agents is weaker in the West, where large tracts 
of land (and in some states, the majority of land holdings) are under federal jurisdiction. Western state 
citizens address many of their demands to federal agencies, although they would usually prefer the state 
agencies to have actual control. 
15. There has been an interesting dichotomy in conservation thinking that has segregated hunting concerns 
from the concerns of mainstream conservationists, although their policy preferences are often 
remarkably similar. A thorough discussion of the extent of this dichotomy and the reasons for it are 
topics for another paper, but I believe they are based in cultural differences (Buck, 1989; Thompson et 
al., 1990) between the two user groups. 
16. This discussion also raises the issue of diffusion of innovation defined by Walker (1969). 
17. ‘The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are 
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people’ (Constitution of the United States, 10th 
Amendment, 1791). 
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